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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
have discussed establishing an international aid mechanism, or fund, to
support low-carbon energy generation and energy efficiency projects in
developing countries. The selection of a fund administrator has been
particularly contentious. Many developed countries believe that, rather
than creating a new fund, the COP should use an already established
one-the World Bank's Clean Technology Fund (CTF)-and select the
World Bank as fund administrator. However, many developing countries
believe the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC should create
a new fund with administrative control retained by the COP. This Note
first uses a public choice economic analysis to examine why different
countries support different fund administrators. Second, it evaluates the
arguments for and against the World Bank's CTF and concludes that the
World Bank must make several important changes for the COP to select
its fund and give it administrative control. Lastly, this Note discusses
how conflict may arise between the World Bank and the United Nations
if the COP does not select the World Bank as fund administrator. The
United Nations does not have any direct control over the World Bank's
decision to continue to operate its fund, but the countries that are parties
to the UNFCCC may have a legal obligation to support whichever fund
the COP selects.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, public international political and financial
institutionsi have increasingly taken center stage in the debate over
international environmental law. The United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972 was the first international conference
specifically intended to address environmental problems. 2 The
Conference marked a turning point in that countries recognized the
need for widespread collaboration to confront global environmental
problems. The Conference established a precedent for using
international institutions to facilitate collaboration,3 and it led to the
creation of the Stockholm Declaration, 4 a document that typifies one of
the central difficulties of international environmental diplomacy-the
divide between developed and developing countries.5 The Declaration is
replete with instances of conflict between developed and developing
countries, and even now, almost forty years later, the competing
interests of these two groups continue to shape international
environmental law.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) builds upon the work of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment. International institutions play a central role
in the climate change debate, and divisions between developed and
developing countries perennially affect international negotiations of the
Conference of the Parties6 (COP) to the UNFCCC. 7 The root of the
division is how developed and developing countries want to allocate
responsibility for past and future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but
1. When I refer to "public international institutions," I mean intergovernmental
organizations whose members are nation-states and that are concerned with issues of global or
international governance.
2. Shawkat Alam, The United Nations' Approach to Trade, The Environment and
Sustainable Development, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 610 (2006).
3. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 17 (1998).
4. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
5. Gaetan Verhoosel, Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development:
Transferring Environmentally Sound Technologies, 11 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 49 & n.1
(1998).
6. For those unfamiliar with the UNFCCC, it is both the name of a treaty and the name of a
United Nations' Secretariat responsible for the operations of the treaty. Also, the COP is the
governing body of the UNFCCC, and its members include all the countries that are signatories
to the UNFCCC. There are also a number of observer organizations that attend COP meetings.
7. Daniel Bodansky, Current Development- The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A
Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 232, 234 (2010) (noting the disputes between developed and
developing countries during the meetings in Bali and Copenhagen).
482
THE FIGHT FOR CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUNDS
the divide between the two groups extends well beyond that, affecting
nearly every facet of climate change negotiations.
International aid money is one of the primary divisions between
developed and developing countries. Many countries have expressed the
view that developed countries should set aside international aid money
to help developing countries purchase clean energy technology.8 The aid
money would give developing countries an incentive to invest in low-
carbon technology as their economies modernize. Furthermore, because
developed countries have used an inequitable share of the atmospheric
commons to further their own economic growth, the aid money would
also serve as compensation to developing nations.
The debate over clean technology aid, however, is about more than
the amount of money; the mechanism used to deliver the money is
equally important.9 If adequate funding can be amassed, an
international organization will need to be selected or created to
administer those funds. In fact, several organizations are already
posturing for the role of clean technology fund administrator. The World
Bank, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and a new (currently
hypothetical) institution created by the COP are the three most likely
choices for clean technology fund administrator. In the future, other
organizations may vie for the position, but these three organizations
appear to be the only options currently available.
After a brief description of these organizations, this Note examines
the negotiating positions and motivations of three different groups
within the COP: (1) developed countries, including the United States
and several European countries; (2) large developing countries that emit
substantial amounts of GHGs; and (3) the least developed countries
(LDCs) and the small island nations. This section concludes that even
though their motivations are not the same, each country wants the
same thing: for the clean technology fund administrator to be the
institution with which they retain the most influence. However, for
some countries, choosing a clean technology fund administrator may
have more to do with diplomatic or monetary benefits than a desire to
mitigate climate change.
Next, this Note considers which international organization is best
suited to be the clean technology fund administrator. This analysis
8. See Group of 77 [G-77], Ministerial Declaration, para. 31 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.g77.org/doctDeclaration2008.htm (stating that during the thirteenth COP to the
UNFCCC the G-77 ministers "urged the international community to assist developing countries
to address the consequences of climate change particularly through new, additional and
predictable financial resources, capacity building, and access to and transfer of technology.).
9. David B. Hunter, International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities and Challenges for
the Obama Administration, 19 DUKE ENvTL. L & POL'Y F. 247, 262 (2009).
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highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the World Bank's CTF,1o the
GEF, and a new institution that the COP would create. In some
respects, a comparison of the institutions is difficult because the final
structure of a COP-led clean technology fund is unknown. However, the
World Bank's CTF suffers from several important problems, and this
section concludes that, without reformation of the Bank's CTF, a new
COP-created fund would be a better alternative.
Lastly, this Note explores the legal connection between the World
Bank and the United Nations. The World Bank is a specialized agency
of the United Nations," and the two organizations are connected
through a number of international agreements. Nevertheless, conflict
may arise between the two institutions if the COP does not select the
World Bank's CTF. After analyzing the key agreements between the
World Bank and the United Nations that relate to the CTF, this Note
determines that the United Nations has no legal avenue to force the
Bank to shut down its CTF. However, the countries that are parties to
the UNFCCC may have a legal obligation to support whichever fund the
COP selects as administrator. If countries cannot fulfill their obligations
to the UNFCCC by funding the World Bank's CTF, countries may stop
funding it.
This Note concludes that although the World Bank's CTF does have
several advantages, it also has important structural flaws. Developing
countries in the COP are unlikely to vote for the World Bank as clean
technology fund administrator because of these flaws. Furthermore,
without the support of developing countries for a clean technology fund
administrator, it is unlikely that the COP process will result in a
climate change treaty. While the COP is not without problems of its
own, the UNFCCC currently seems to be the most likely process
through which the world will develop a comprehensive climate change
treaty.
I. BACKGROUND
The World Bank and the COP have both established interim clean
technology funds. On July 1, 2008, the World Bank's Board of Directors
10. There are two "clean technology funds" referred to in this Note. The first is the World
Bank's CTF, designated by the acronym CTF. The second use of "clean technology fund" is a
general reference to the concept of any fund, including one developed by the COP, that provides
international aid for low-carbon and energy efficiency projects. When the second meaning is
intended, "clean technology fund" is written out.
11. Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Approved by the General Assembly on November 15, 1947, 2 INTL ORG. 198,
198, art. I, para. 1 (1948) [hereinafter Agreement between UN and IBRD].
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approved the Climate Investment Funds (CIF).12 The CIF consists of
two funds, the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF) and the CTF.13 The SCF
deals primarily with adaptation financing, 14 and the CTF "invest[s] in
projects . . . that contribute to the demonstration, deployment, and
transfer of low-carbon technologies."15 As this Note concerns clean
technology financing rather than adaptation financing, the CTF will be
the focus of further inquiry.
The United Nations uses four different financial institutions for
climate change-related projects in developing countries: (1) the Global
Environment Facility (GEF); (2) the Adaptation Fund (AF); (3) the
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF); and (4) the Least Developed
Countries Fund (LDCF). The GEF administers the SCCF and LDCF,16
but the COP of the UNFCCC created the two funds. The COP of the
UNFCCC also created the AF, which is managed by the Adaptation
Fund Board in conjunction with the GEF.17 The AF and the LDCF
finance adaptation projects,18 while the GEF and SCCF finance both
adaptation and clean technology projects.19
In some respects, the GEF represents a bridge between the World
Bank and the COP. The World Bank initially started the GEF in 1991,
but it is now an independent organization.20 However, the World Bank
still serves as the trustee of the GEF trust fund and provides
12. World Bank Group, Climate Investment Funds History, CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUNDS,
http/www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cifldesignprocess (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
13. Id.
14. Adaptation financing supports projects that allow human beings and ecosystems to cope
with the environmental changes brought about by climate change. Clean technology financing
supports projects that mitigate or slow the process of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas
emssions.
15. David R. Downes et al., International Environmental Law, 43 INT'L LAW. 837, 855 (2009)
(quoting Press Release, The World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: Countries Selected for
Governing Bodies, U.N. Press Release 2009/120/SDN (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http/web.worldbank.org/WBSITEfEXTERNAINEWS/0,,contentMDK21944136~menuPK510
62077-pagePK34370-piPK34424-theSitePK4607,00.html.).
16. LDC Fund, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/cooperation support/leasLdevelopedcountries
portal/ldcfundlitems/4723.php (last visited December 2, 2010); Special Climate Change Fund,
UNFCCC, http//unfce.intlcooperationandsupport/fnancial mechanism/special-climate
changefund/items/3657.php (last visited December 2, 2010).
17. Adaptation Fund, UNFCCC, httpJ/unfecc.int/cooperationandsupport/fmancial
_mechanism/adaptationfundlitems/3659.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
18. See ADAPrATION FUND, http//www.adaptation-fund.org (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); Least
Developed Countries Fund, GEF, http-//www.thegef.com/geffldcf (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
19. Climate Change, GEF, http/www.thegef.org/gef/climate-change (last visited Aug. 28,
2010); Special Climate Change Fund, GEF, http://www.thegef.com/gef/secf (last visited Aug. 28,
2010).
20. What is the GEF, GEF, http//www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
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administrative services,21 and the COP approves guidance "on policies,
program priorities, and eligibility criteria."22 In addition, the GEF is the
interim agency that administers the LDCF and the SCCF.23 Yet, some
developing countries are skeptical of using the GEF as a permanent
clean technology fund administrator. They believe that the structure of
the GEF gives developed countries more power than developing
countries.24 While the GEF represents a possible alternative to the COP
and the World Bank, both developed and developing countries have
released statements that indicate that most nations consider the COP
and the World Bank the two most likely candidates for clean technology
fund administrator.
Recapping the above, Table 1 illustrates how the current financial
institutions are organized, although there is some overlap between
organizations:
Table 1. International Aid Mechanisms for Climate Change
Organizations with . Funds that Engage in
Clean Technology and Futat Enanein Clean Technology
Adaptation Funds Financing
The World Bank Strategic Climate Fund Clean Technology Fund
Adaptation Fund, Least
Developed Countries Special Climate Change
Fund, Special Climate Fund
Change Fund
Global Environment Global Environment Global Environment
Facility Facility Facility
21. Id.
22. United Nations Conference on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009,
Report of the GEF to the Ffteenth Session of the Conference to the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 6, U.N. Doc. FCCCICP/2009/09 (Oct. 27, 2009),
available at http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/09.pdf.
23. See Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF),
GEF, http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/LDCF-SCCF-22Feb2010.pdf
(last visited December 2, 2010).
24. Hunter, supra note 9, at 262-63 ('The GEF offers an arguably more democratic structure
[than the World Bank] based on double majority-voting, but the GEPs effectiveness and
independence in delivering aid has been questioned, particularly by developing countries.").
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II. DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PREFER DIFFERENT CLEAN
TECHNOLOGY FUND ADMINISTRATORS
Developing nations would prefer to vest administrative control of
the clean technology fund in a new organization created by the COP.25
Conversely, many developed countries prefer the World Bank's CTF.26
However, countries that support the same organization often have
different motivations. This section will explore why different groups of
countries support either the World Bank's CTF or a hypothetical, new
COP-created fund.
In determining which organization will be selected as clean
technology fund administrator, not only the climate is at stake; there
are billions of dollars in foreign aid on the negotiating table. Many
countries are spending significant time, money, and political capital to
negotiate for a clean technology fund that prioritizes the goals that each
country holds most dear. This is what public choice theorists refer to as
"rent seeking." Rent seeking is "the use of resources for the purpose of
obtaining rents for people where the rents themselves come from some
activity that has negative social value."27 One of the most common
examples of rent seeking is when a company hires a lobbyist to advocate
for favorable legislation. From the company's perspective, there can be a
significant return on their lobbying expense, but the lobbying does not
provide any benefits to society, for it merely redistributes wealth from
taxpayers to special interest groups. On top of that, the lobbyist walks
away with his or her fee. Because the lobbying itself costs the company
money and society does not gain anything, on the whole, rent seeking
results in a net loss in societal wealth. A form of rent seeking also
occurs when special interest groups put pressure on their home
countries to send diplomats to the COP who will negotiate for a clean
technology fund administrator that will be advantageous to the special
interest groups' goals. This activity does not create wealth; instead, the
intent is to direct aid money to an organization favored by special
interest groups. Nevertheless, not all rent seeking should be
25. Matthew Stilwell, G- 77 and China propose enhanced financial mechanism for UNFCCC,
CHOIKE (Aug. 26, 2008), http//www.choike.org/2009/eng/informes/7003.html (noting that a
representative of the G-77 and China, Bernarditas Muller, stated that the G-77 wishes to create
"an effective financial mechanism under the Conference of Parties with the goal of ensuring the
full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention's obligations relating to financial
resources).
26. See Henry Paulson et al., Financial Bridge from Dirty to Clean Technology, FIN. TIMES
(London) (Feb. 8, 2008), http//www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43975af2-d5e7-lldc-bbb2-0000779fd2ac.
html?ncickcheck-l (advocating for a new clean technology fund administered by the World
Bank).
27. GORDON TULLocK Er AL, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 43 (2002).
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discouraged. Just because it is economically wasteful to seek a rent does
not mean that the goal, or rent itself, has negative societal value. For
example, Gordon Tullock notes that it would be rent seeking for an
organization to lobby the government for funds to pay for cancer
research, but most people would agree that finding a cure for cancer is a
laudable goal. 28
The following examples regarding clean technology fund
negotiations should make this distinction clear. Countries are likely to
use their resources to negotiate for a clean technology fund
administrator for three primary reasons. First, some developed
countries believe that influencing the fund will allow them to direct
awards to countries with which they are on friendly terms. This could
result in diplomatic benefits that manifest through trade or security
reciprocity. Second, some developing countries believe that by
influencing the fund they can increase the amount of foreign aid they
will receive, benefiting certain special interests. The rent being sought
here is purely financial. Third, some countries wish to control the clean
technology fund administrator because the risks of climate change are
so devastating to their country that other benefits pale in comparison.
Accordingly, mitigating climate change would be the central goal in
these countries.
Clearly not all rents or reasons are of equal worth to society. The
first and the second reasons likely have little societal value and are self-
interested. The third reason is still self-interested, but mitigating
climate change has great societal value as well. This example is
admittedly an exaggeration, though. Countries in the first and second
examples want to mitigate climate change too, but they have important
secondary motivations for choosing a clean technology fund
administrator. Their desire to mitigate climate change should be
recognized, but it should be tempered by the knowledge that those
countries' secondary motivations may take precedence over their desire
to mitigate climate change. Understanding what rents a country is
seeking is essential to objectively evaluating their stance on the
selection of a clean technology fund administrator. If a country's aims
are self-interested, as when based on the first two rationales, then its
justifications for choosing one clean technology fund administrator over
another should be more critically examined. On the other hand, if a
country's goals are in line with the goals of society as a whole, like when
relying on the third rationale, then it lends credence to that country's
argument.
28. Id. at 43-44.
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This section looks at three groups of countries and attempts to
understand each group's motivation. The three groups are: (1) developed
countries, including the United States and several European countries;
(2) large developing countries that emit substantial amounts of
greenhouse gases (GHGs); and (3) the least developed countries (LDCs)
and small island nations. Each group was chosen because they
represent a key interest group in the climate change debate. This Note
assumes that countries are self-interested, but as the prior discussion of
rent seeking demonstrates, self-interest can manifest itself in ways that
benefit society.
A. Developed Countries Prefer the World Bank's CTF
Developed countries cannot prevent climate change through GHG
reductions in their countries alone.29 In fact, reducing emissions is often
cheaper in some developing countries.30 For example, if land is less
expensive in a developing country, terrestrial sequestration 1 may be
cheaper there. Also, the projected rise in GHG emissions in developing
countries vastly outpaces the projected rise in developed countries.32 If
developed countries reduce only their own emissions, global GHG
emissions will still rise due to the projected increase in developing
countries' emissions. Therefore, developed and developing countries
must work together to mitigate climate change.33
29. ExaminingAdministration's Proposal to Establish Multilateral Clean Technology Fund-
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Domestic and Intl Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. of H. Comm.
on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (statement of David Wheeler, Senior Fellow, Center for
Global Development) ("[N]ational GHG emission targets in the U.S. and other rich countries
cannot achieve the necessary reductions in C02 and other greenhouse gases.'); see also Paul G.
Harris, The European Union and Environmental Change Sharing the Burdens of Global
Warming, 17 COW. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 309, 315 (2006) ("[The developed countries cannot
by themselves solve this problem; comprehensive participation of the developed countries and
the major developing countries is required.).
30. Jeffrey A. Frankel, Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2 (Brookings Institution, Policy Brief No.
52, 1999), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1999/06energy-frankel.aspx.
31. Terrestrial sequestration occurs when plants and trees absorb carbon dioxide. If one
plants more trees or, perhaps more likely, refrains from cutting down as many trees,
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will likely decrease.
32. Global Greenhouse Gas Data, EPA, http1/www.epa.gov/climatechange/
emissions/globalghg.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
33. See Paulson, supra note 26 (In 2008, the U.S. Secretary of Treasury and the finance
ministers of the United Kingdom and Japan echoed this idea, noting that if energy consumption
continues along the current path in developing countries, future development will have a greater
impact on our climate. "We have no choice but to help developing countries reduce the carbon
footprint of development and make their economies climate change resilient.").
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However, as quickly as developed and developing countries agree
that international aid is a necessary part of a climate change treaty,
they just as quickly disagree over who should administer the funds.
Although there has been some indication that leaders in developed
countries are changing their stances, 34 in general, developed countries
support the World Bank's CTF. Furthermore, developed countries'
current support for the CTF appears to have carried over into support
for the CTF as the long-term clean technology fund used by the COP.
1. The U.S. Perspective
In 2008, the Bush Administration expressed its support for the
World Bank's CTF35 and asked Congress to appropriate two billion
dollars to the fund over a three-year period.36 The first installment of
the two billion dollars was supposed to occur in the 2009 fiscal year with
a $400 million appropriation. When the appropriations bill, House
Resolution 1105, was passed in February 2009, however, appropriations
to the World Bank's CTF were noticeably absent.37 Several legislators
were concerned that money appropriated to the CTF would not be used
to support what they considered to be clean energy projects.38 Because
the CTF uses a technology neutral approach to determine which energy
projects should receive funding, it could be used to fund fossil fuel power
projects.39 For instance, if the CTF provides funding for a utility to build
a more efficient coal-fired power plant than the utility would otherwise,
the CTF is preventing GHG emissions equal to the difference in
emissions between the new technology plant and the old technology
34. Ama Marston, Resistance to Bank's Role in Climate Finance as Alternatives Gain
Traction, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (June 17, 2010), http//www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-
566400 ('[U]nder pressure the US may be withdrawing from such staunch support for the
Bank's role.").
35. See Paulson, supra note 26 (Former Treasury Secretary Paulson explained that "[b]y
pooling our efforts to support a new clean technology fund, administered by the World Bank, we
can help developing countries bridge the gap between dirty and clean technology.).
36. MARTIN A. WEISS & JEFFREY LOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 2289, THE WORLD
BANK'S CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUND 2 (2008).
37. Omnibus Appropriations Act, H.R. 1105, 111th Cong. (2009).
38. WEISS & LOGAN, supra note 36, at 4 ('The primary concern raised in Congress about the
CTF involves the types of 'clean' technologies the World Bank may support. Several Members
have questioned whether the CTF should be 'technology neutral,' thus allowing CTF resources to
fund carbon-based investments. This was the central debate during a June 5, 2008 House
Financial Services Committee hearing on the CTF.").
39. See Lisa Friedman, World Bank- Congress Scraps Support for Clean Technology Program
that Funds Coal, CLIMATE WIRE, Feb. 25, 2009 (noting the World Bank's criteria allow financing
for ultra-supercritical coal-fired power plants with a carbon intensity of less than 0.795 tons per
megawatt-hour).
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plant. Several members of Congress were dissatisfied with this
technology neutral approach. Consequently, instead of giving money to
the CTF, House Resolution 1105 appropriated $100 million to the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for its
clean technology investments abroad.40 The funding to USAID was
conditioned on the agency including carbon accounting-i.e. "including
in project feasibility calculations a cost for the resulting greenhouse gas
emissions"-when deciding which projects to fund. 41 The result of this
condition was that it would be nearly impossible for funding to be
allocated to coal projects.
Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has also
expressed support for the World Bank's CTF.42 For the 2010 fiscal year,
President Obama asked that $500 million be appropriated to the CTF.43
Congress did not appropriate the entire amount, but the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2010 did provide up to $300 million to the CTF.44
In contrast to Congress's prior concerns, this Act also does not prohibit
the CTF from using the appropriated money to fund fossil fuel power
projects.
The Obama Administration has also advocated for the international
use of the World Bank's CTF. In December 2009, President Obama
helped negotiate the Copenhagen Accord, which notes that developed
countries should establish an international aid mechanism for climate
change with $100 billion of annual funding by 2020.45 Since
Copenhagen, the Obama Administration has again expressed its
support for the World Bank's CTF, stating in a recent submission to the
UNFCCC that "[it] would consider it desirable for the [COP] to invite
the World Bank to serve as Trustee of the new Fund and, in this regard,
to organize a process to take steps to establish the Fund."46
40. Joel Meister, U.S. Congress Cuts Funds for World Bank's So-Called Clean Technology
Fund, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEv. (Feb. 25, 2009), http-/blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/
2009/02/us-congress-cuts-funds-for-wor.php.
4 1. Id.
42. See Lisa Friedman, Climate: Obama Admin Endorses World Bank's Technology Fund, E
& E NEWS PM, May 8, 2009 (quoting the President's Climate Change Envoy, Todd Stern, who
expressed the administration's support for the CTF).
43. Robin Bravender, Climate: Obama Admin Urges House to Boost Funding for Int'l
Programs, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, July 9, 2009.
44. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 7909 (LexisNexis 2010).
45. See James Kanter, Copenhagen's One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money
Flowing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/businessenergy-
environment/21iht-green2l.html.
46. UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, June 1-11 2010, Additional Views on Which the Chair May Draw in Preparing Text
to Facilitate Negotiations Among Parties, 83, U.N. Doe. GE.10-60794 (April 30, 2010), available
at httpJ/unfcc.int/resourcedocs/2010/awgcal0/eng/miscO2.pdf.
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The Obama Administration's support for the CTF is likely based on
many factors. The U.S. influence over the World Bank's CTF is of
particular importance. The United States and the rest of the Group of 8
(G8) were the principal architects of the CTF, and some commentators
have argued that the World Bank's CTF gives disproportionate weight
to the opinions of these developed countries.47 The Administration may
believe that the World Bank's CTF is an efficient and accountable aid
mechanism and, desiring efficient allocation of funds, the
Administration may support the CTF because the United States has
greater influence over the World Bank than the COP. This Note
examines these claims in a later section and concludes that several of
the CTF's procedures do, in fact, favor developed countries.
The United States may operate on the belief that developed
countries are better suited to decide how international aid should be
allocated. If the United States exerts influence over the CTF, funding
may be directed solely to projects in countries that are friendly to U.S.
foreign policy or trade goals. In this way, whether acting selfishly or
paternalistically, the United States is ignoring fundamental principles
of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC directs that, in providing funding for
international aid, developed countries must give full consideration to
the special needs of small island nations and the least developed
countries.48 None of these countries support the World Bank's CTF
because the CTF does not recognize their special needs. For
international aid money to be used efficiently, developed countries need
to see developing countries as partners and recognize that international
aid should be used to mitigate climate change, not for some ancillary
trade or security goal.
2. The EU Perspective
Several European countries helped form the CTF with the United
States. The G8, which advised the World Bank on the creation of the
CTF, includes four members of the European Union: the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.4 9 The EU President also
47. Celine Tan, No Additionality, New Conditionality: A Critique of the World Bank's Climate
Investment Fu4nds, THIRD WORLD NETWoRK, May 30, 2008, at 12-14, available at
http//www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/Paper.by.Celine.doc.
48. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4 sec. 8, June 4, 1992-
June 19, 1993, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force March 21, 1994), available at
http1/unfecc.int/resourceldoes/convkplconveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
49. Member States, MUsKOKA 2010 G-8, http-/g8.gc.ca/about/member-states (last visited Oct.
18, 2010).
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participates in the G8.50 While not all members of the European Union
have indicated that they support the World Bank's fund, G8 support of
the CTF shows that at least several powerful EU countries do support
it. For instance, in 2008, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden,
Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and France pledged well over $2.5
billion to the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), which includes both the
CTF and the SCF.si These countries may be motivated to support the
CTF for the same reasons as the United States.
However, just because several EU countries made significant
pledges to the World Bank's CTF does not mean that they will in fact
provide $2.5 billion in funding. The support the United States has given
to the CTF is nowhere near the two billion dollars President Bush
pledged. Consequently, because the United States has failed to provide
the level of funds it pledged, these EU countries may also not provide
the full amount of support they originally pledged.52 In addition, other
climate funds may be gaining increased traction in Europe. For
example, Spain recently eschewed the World Bank's CIF and instead
provided $55 million to the COP's AF.53 As the first contribution of its
kind, this may set a precedent for other EU countries. 54 Many European
countries may continue to align themselves with the World Bank's CTF,
but others may follow Spain's lead.
B. Developing Countries Prefer the COP
Developing countries' position on the administration of an
international clean technology fund has remained the same for many
years. In Confronting Climate Change, Kilaparti Ramakrishna and
Oran R. Young, two climate change policy experts, point out that as
important as "new, additional, and adequate funds" are for developing
countries confronting climate change, "[m]any representatives of
developing countries have stated clearly that a successful conclusion of
a meaningful climate change convention depends upon realizing access
50. Id.
51. Press Release, World Bank, Donor Nations Pledge Over $6.1 Billion to Climate
Investment Funds, U.N. Press Release 2009/092/SDN (Sept. 26, 2008), available at
httpJ/web.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNAlJNEWS/0,,contentMDK21916602-pagePK3437
0-piPK34424-theSitePK4607,00.html.
52. David Wheeler, End of the Road for the World Bank's Clean Technology Fund?, CENTER
FOR GLOBAL DEv. (Feb. 25, 2009), httpl/blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2009/02/end-of-the-
road-for-the-world.php ('The EU and Japan seem unlikely to support the CTF without the
United States .. ..").
53. Marston, supra note 34.
54. Id.
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to these funds."5 5 This analysis from 1992 is just as true today as it was
then. "Developing countries have stated over and over again that the
climate fund should be controlled by the parties to the convention, and
not by existing mechanisms or institutions."56
Yet one must tread carefully when talking about the will of so-called
"developing countries," for the monikers of "developed" and "developing"
have begun to lose meaning as the economic gap between some rich and
poor countries has shrunk. The term "developing country" seemingly
lumps together nations as diverse as China and Burundi, even though
China may have more in common with a "developed" country like Japan.
The Group of 77 (G-77), a voting bloc that includes 131 developing
countries with drastically different interests and needs, exemplifies this
point.57 The G-77 as a group has issued statements in support of a COP-
led clean technology fund,58 but because of the varied interests of the
131 countries in the G-77, not every country supports a COP-led fund
for the same reasons. This section analyzes the motivations of three
representative groups of countries within the G-77: large developing
countries that are large emitters, small island states, and LDCs.
Because small island states and LDCs have similar motivations, they
are analyzed together.
1. Large Developing Countries That Are Large Emitters
According to a report by the World Resources Institute, China,
India, and Brazil are among the top ten countries worldwide for GHG
emissions, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and population.59 In fact, by
some estimates, China is now the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in
the world.60 However, unlike many of the other top emitters, China,
India, and Brazil have issued statements in conjunction with the G-77
55. Kilaparti Ramakrishna & Oran R. Young, International Organisations in a Warming
World: Building a Global Climate Regime, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS,
IMPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES 253, 263 (Irving M. Mintzer ed., 1992).
56. Id.
57. Member States of the Group of 77, G-77, http//www.g77.org/doc/members.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010).
58. G-77, supra note 8.
59. KEVIN A. BAUMERT ET AL., WoRLD RESoURcES INSTITUTE, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS:
GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 110 (2005), available at
http/pdf.wri.org/navigating-numbers.pdf.
60. China Now No. 1 in C02 Emissions; USA in Second Position, PBL NETH. ENVTL ASSESS.
AGENCY,
http//www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechangelmoreinfo/ChinanownolinCO2emissionsUSAinseco
ndposition.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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that the COP should control clean technology funds6 1 because they
believe the COP will provide more equitable representation of aid
recipients. 62
These three countries are comparatively much wealthier than other
members of the G-77, but they are nonetheless positioning themselves
to receive international aid for clean technology. This is not surprising
because, for a number of reasons that will be discussed below, populous
developing countries with large economies stand to benefit the most
from clean technology aid. Also, China, India, and Brazil can plausibly
argue that they should receive clean technology aid because they have
relatively low per capita GHG emissions.63 However, as their emissions
increase over time, their argument loses validity. Large developing
countries that are rapidly industrializing will want to have as much
political influence on the clean technology fund administrator as
possible because it will help them secure clean technology aid in the
long term, when their per capita emissions levels approach that of
current developed countries.
Developing countries are skeptical that any World Bank-
administered fund would give their opinions adequate consideration.
"Much of this scepticism emerged after the initial discussions leading to
the formation of GEF, which took place only between participating
agencies and contributing countries, and which did not involve
developing countries."64 Spurned once by the GEF, China and other
developing countries are reluctant to give the World Bank
administrative control of clean technology funds.
That skepticism may be well founded, but large developing countries
with large economies are interested in more than just representation in
a clean technology fund. They stand to gain more financial support from
clean technology funds than any other group. The sheer size of their
economies means that they will have to initiate many clean technology
61. E.g., Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference, PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBuc OF CHINA TO THE UN (May
20, 2009), httpJ/www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandunleconomicdevelopment/climatechanget
t568959.htm (The Chinese government has released a statement, which states that "to
effectively operationalize the financial mechanism under the UNFCCC, . . . a Multilateral
Technology Acquisition Fund ... shall be established. The governance of these Funds should be
under the authority and guidance of the COP with equitable and balanced representation of all
Parties in a transparent and efficient manner.").
62. See G-77, Proposal by the G-77 & China for A Technology Mechanism under the
UNFCCC 1-2, UNFCCC, http//unfccc.int/files/meetings/adhoc-working-groups/1calapplication/
pdfltechnology-proposalg77_8.pdf.
63. BAUMERT, supra note 59, at 18, 22.
64. Ramakrishna & Young, supra note 55, at 263.
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projects to achieve even a small reduction in their overall GHG
emissions.
Also, countries like China, India, and Brazil may be better
candidates for funding because they are more developed than other
developing countries. Donor countries will want to ensure that their
money goes to projects that verifiably reduce emissions. The effect of one
metric ton of carbon dioxide produced in China is essentially the same
as one metric ton of carbon dioxide produced in Uruguay. Therefore, to
determine which developing countries should receive funding, the
administrator of the fund will likely favor countries that can better
track emissions reductions. Because countries like China, India, and
Brazil are more developed, they will likely have access to the
technologies and managerial skills needed to report and track the
results of clean technology fund projects.
The interest of China, India, and Brazil in representation and
funding does not mean that these countries are not also interested in
forestalling climate change. They are all highly susceptible to its effects.
For example, according to some predictions, climate change will greatly
reduce water resources throughout China, and northern and western
China will be especially affected.65 Also, per capita GDP in China, India,
and Brazil is still fairly low, meaning that some population segments of
these countries could have difficulty adapting to the effects of climate
change. Therefore, both a desire for aid money and an interest in
efficiently mitigating climate change are likely guiding motivations for
these countries.
2. Least Developed Countries and Small Island States
Small island states and the least developed countries are
particularly concerned about the effect climate change will have on their
countries. Most of the small island states are represented in climate
change talks by an organization called the Alliance of Small Island
States (AOSIS).66 The fifty countries designated by the United Nations
as LDCs work together in what is known as the Group of LDCs. Both
65. See NATL DEV. AND REFORM COMM'N CHINA, CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAMME, 17-18 (2007), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/PO2007060456119
1006823.pdf.
66. See About AOSIS, AOSIS, http-/www.sidsnet.org/aosis/about.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2010) ("The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of small island and low-lying
coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the
environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. It
functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing States
(SIDS) within the United Nations system!").
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AOSIS and the Group of LDCs have expressed support for a COP-led
fund.67
Although some members of AOSIS are also LDCs, many of the
countries in the two groups have drastically different economic and
political environments. For example, the U.S. Virgin Islands, a small
island state, has more than fifty times the per capita income of Guinea-
Bissau, which is an LDC.68 Despite these differences, both groups are
particularly susceptible to the negative impacts of climate change.
Small island nations like Tuvalu face the frightening possibility that the
rising sea will swallow the country.69 LDCs like Burundi and Guinea-
Bissau are often equally cursed by geography, but their extremely low
GDP prevents them from making adequate investments in climate
adaptation projects.
Although small island nations and LDCs are highly susceptible to
climate change, neither group is likely to receive substantial aid for
clean technology, nor is this their motivation. Compared to large
developing countries like China, India, and Brazil, small island states
and LDCs have low GDPs, 70 relatively low GHG emissions,71 and, at
least for some LDCs, a lack of infrastructure and government
accountability. Clean technology fund projects will most likely take
place in countries that are rapidly industrializing but still have high
GHG emissions from outdated technology. If a country already has very
low emissions, like most small island states and LDCs, clean technology
funding would be of little use. Both AOSIS and the Group of LDCs have
been active in advocating for a clean technology fund administrator
67. Nicola Cantore et al., Climate Negotiations and Development: How Can Low-Income
Countries Gain from a Climate Negotiation Framework Agreement? 3 (Overseas Dev. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 312, 2009), available at http-J/wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsfldb900sid/ASAZ-
7YADCS/$file/ODI Nov2009.pdfopenelement ('The LDC Group and AOSIS supports [sic] the
China proposal for a technology window, established in the new financial mechanism under the
control of the COP, which shall support implementation of concrete and practical technology
activities.").
68. Compare Data of Virgin Islands (U.S.), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
country/virgin-islands-us (last visited October 18, 2010) (showing per capita Gross National
Income of $13,660) with Data of Guinea-Bissau, WORLD BANK, httpi/data.worldbank.org/
country/guinea-bissau (last visited October 18, 2010) (showing per capita Gross National Income
of $250).
69. Tuvalu and Global Warming, TUVALU ISLANDS, http://www.tuvaluislands.com/
warming.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
70. World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP - Per Capita, CIA, httpsJ/www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
71. See Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial National Communications From Parties
Not Included in Annex I to the Convention, Subsidiary Body for Implementation, UNFCCC, 23d
Sess., Nov. 28, 2005-Dec. 6, 2005, para. 38, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2, (Oct. 25, 2005),
available at httpJ/unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advancedsearch/items/3594.phprec=
j&priref=-600003580#beg.
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through the COP, but it is unlikely that these groups are setting
themselves up to become primary clean technology fund aid recipients.
The vulnerability of small island states and LDCs, however, makes
them excellent candidates for adaptation aid. Their support of the COP
to administer clean technology funds could be a calculated move to
convince large countries like China, India, and Brazil to support the
efforts of AOSIS and the Group of LDCs to have the COP control
adaptation funds. LDCs and small island states have more influence in
the COP than with the World Bank, so they are likely to want the COP
to control adaptation funds. LDCs and small island states could be
engaging in some kind of quid pro quo with large developing countries
that want the COP to control clean technology funds. However, it is
somewhat of a stretch to assume that small island states and LDCs
would put all their eggs in the adaptation basket. The more likely
explanation is that small island states recognize that adaptation to
climate change will only get them so far and that they need a climate
change strategy that emphasizes both adaptation and mitigation. Their
support for a COP-created fund over the CTF is most likely based on
their assumption that a COP-created fund would be more successful in
mitigating climate change. As they stand to lose the most from the
effects of climate change, the views of AOSIS and the Group of LDCs
are not unbiased, but they are probably the most consistent with what
should be the goal of a clean technology fund-mitigating climate
change.
III. THE COP SHOULD CONTROL CLEAN TECHNOLOGY AID
While the previous section examined why different countries
support either the COP or the World Bank's CTF as administrator, this
section compares the administrators based on efficiency, ethics, and
politics, and considers whether there is a better way to administer
funds. Based on this analysis, I conclude that the World Bank's CTF
suffers from several important flaws that make it an unviable option.
Unless the World Bank's CTF is reformed, the COP should create a new
institution to administer clean technology funds.
A. Comparing the COP to the CTF
As I mentioned earlier in this Note, it is difficult to draw a full
comparison between the CTF and a COP-created fund because the final
structure of a COP-created fund is only hypothetical. Nonetheless, we
can theorize about what a COP-created fund would look like based on
the expressed interests of the stakeholders in the COP process and past
498
THE FIGHT FOR CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUNDS
United Nations' experience with international aid mechanisms. While I
believe this type of comparison is useful, this section of the Note can
also be thought of as simply a critique of the World Bank's CTF.
Specifically, this section examines the issues both organizations face
with regard to governance and procedural fairness, environmental
concerns, past administrative experience, and how the selection of each
fund would impact other goals of a climate change treaty.
1. Governance and Procedural Fairness
To avert climate change, developing countries will need to reduce
their GHG emissions in the long run. However, they will not agree to
firm emissions reductions without an equitably structured clean
technology fund. For this reason, equitable governance is perhaps the
most important criteria for evaluating a clean technology fund. This
section provides a comparative evaluation of the governing structure of
the COP process and the World Bank's CTF.
Equitable governance can mean different things to different
countries. For donor countries, this might require that they have final
say in what projects receive clean technology aid because they want
verification of how their money is being used. After all, a clean
technology fund would not exist without the donors' contributions. For
developing countries, equitable governance might mean that countries
that are eligible to receive clean technology fund aid should decide
among themselves who should receive funding. In this instance, clean
technology fund aid would essentially be compensation to developing
countries for harm caused by developed countries' emissions.
Alternatively, equitable governance might mean that countries with the
lowest per capita GHG emissions should be given decision-making
authority. As discussed previously, countries with the lowest per capita
emissions are generally the least developed countries, and those
countries are likely to suffer the most harm from climate change.
All three are reasonable ethical viewpoints, and, practically
speaking, the COP is unlikely to select a fund administrator or create a
fund that only considers one group's views. Without the donors' support
there will be no money, yet developing countries are unlikely to agree to
reduce their own future GHG emissions if they are not given adequate
say in the administration of the clean technology fund. Rather than
arbitrarily choosing among each group's definition of equitable
governance, the more prudent approach is simply to recognize that each
group has a justifiable argument and that a clean technology fund
administrator should therefore operate on a consensus basis. This
means that developed country donors and developing country donees
499
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
should have equal voting rights and that developing countries of all
economic statuses should be allowed trustee, or voting, status for the
clean technology fund on a rotating basis.
Unfortunately, what is equitable is not necessarily efficient, and,
admittedly, this approach creates some efficiency and collective action
problems. Many stakeholders and countries will want to weigh in on the
process of choosing a clean technology fund administrator. In the
seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson noted the
difficulty large groups have in cooperating, even in instances where the
members of the group would all be made better off if they did.72
Fortunately, the COP does not seem as doomed to failure as the groups
Olson evaluates. Olson notes that the prohibitively high costs of
organization can inhibit collective action, but where a group has already
been formed, many of those organizational costs have already been
paid.73 Because the COP is a relatively mature international institution,
new, additional costs attributable to the negotiation of a clean
technology fund administrator are unlikely to inhibit negotiations. Also,
in many ways the COP is not such a large group. As this Note has
discussed in detail, the individual parties to the COP have formed
negotiating blocks. Developing and developed countries generally
express themselves through a few organizations, and by forming these
coalitions, the parties to the COP have made it easier to find consensus.
While developing countries believe the COP process is equitable, the
more surprising discovery is that developed countries have not disputed
the equity of the COP process. In fact, developed countries have been
willing participants in many aspects of the COP process. For instance,
they helped draft the Copenhagen Accord, 74 and even the World Bank's
CTF Governance Framework defers, at least in theory, to the equitable
superiority of the COP process.75 However, because equitability is not in
the financial self-interest of developed countries, many of them remain
unwilling to use the COP to develop a clean technology fund, and
instead prefer the World Bank's CTF.
The organization of the World Bank's CTF is based on the
Governance Framework (the Framework) established in November
2008. The Framework creates the CTF Trust Fund Committee (the
72. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcrlON: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 48 (1965).
73. Id. at 46-48.
74. Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Negotiates 'Copenhagen Accord' with Senate Climate Fight
in Mind, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 21, 2009), http//www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/21/21climatewire-
obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121.html.
75. Climate Inv. Funds, Clean Technology Fund Governance Framework, paras. 6, 53-56
(November 2008) [hereinafter Governance Framework], available at httpJ/siteresources.
worldbank.org/ INTCC/Resources/CTFGovernanceFrameworkjan.pdf.
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Committee), the board responsible for all fund decision making. The
Committee is made up of eight representatives from contributor
countries and eight representatives from countries eligible to receive
funds.76 Each representative has equal voting power, so contributor and
recipient countries receive an equal number of votes. Based on the
collective action problems discussed above, it is wise to limit the number
of trustees. If the COP creates a new fund, it should adopt a scheme
similar to this aspect of the World Bank's CTF.
The Committee's voting process also acts as a safeguard against the
collective action problems. Decisions must be made by the consensus of
decision-making members, where no participant decides to block the
proposed decision.77 However, consensus does not necessarily imply
unanimous support. A dissenting member can either choose to block the
decision or let the decision go forward with a statement objecting to all
or part of the decision. If a dissenter chooses to block the decision, the
decision must be postponed or withdrawn.78 Consensus voting seems to
be a fair approach to decision making, but other sections of the
Framework put the fairness of the overall World Bank's CTF structure
in doubt.
The Framework suffers from three primary problems. First, the
selection process for recipient countries to hold a position on the
Committee is potentially inequitable. The Framework states that
recipient countries for the Committee will be "identified through a
consultation among interested eligible recipient countries."79 After the
Framework was developed, some commentators noted that because the
consultation process is vague, it could be implemented in a way that
marginalizes some recipient countries seeking a position on the
Committee.80
The CTF recently held its Partnership Forum, in which new
members of the trust fund committee were selected. It also released a
note that responded to these criticisms by providing some additional
details about the selection process.8' The recipient country members
decided that six of their seats would be allocated on a regional basis,
where recipient countries for each of the World Bank's six designated
76. Id. at para. 19 (a)-(b).
77. Id. at para. 27.
78. Id.
79. Id. at para. 19 (b).
80. Addie Haughey, Note, The World Bank Clean Technology Fund- Fiend or Foe to the
UNFCCC?, 9 SuSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POLY 57, 59 (Winter 2009).
81. Climate Inv. Funds, Note on the Selection of Members to the CTF and SCF Trust Fund
Committees and PPCR Sub-committee (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http1/www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/ciffnode/1155.
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regions will select a representative. 82 The recipient countries decide
together on the two remaining seats.83 Apart from the emphasis on
regional representation, no written requirements exist for how countries
are selected. The lack of a formal written process is troubling. Moreover,
whatever unwritten process is used seems to favor large developing
countries with large emissions over the least developed countries and
small island states. The developing countries that are Committee
members are India, China, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco,
Nigeria, and Egypt; however, no LDCs or small island states are on the
Committee. To be fair, the SCF, the World Bank's adaptation fund, does
include some LDCs, but at least some representation for LDCs and
small island states should be on both Committees-the CTF and the
SCF.
The Framework's second problem is that the Committee's authority
to assign funding to projects is subject to two important restrictions.
First, it is possible the CTF Framework would allow contributor
countries to condition donations to the CTF through their trust fund
administration agreements. In addition, "the executive directors of the
World Bank or any other multilateral bank involved in a specific project
must still approve specific projects."84 Unlike the Committee, the World
Bank does not give equal voting rights to both contributor and recipient
countries.85 The Bank Information Center, an independent group that
monitors the Bank, has described the Bank's voting process as a "one-
dollar-one-vote" system, with developed countries retaining the bulk of
decision-making power.86 Both of these constraints prevent the
Committee from exercising full autonomy and shift the balance of power
back in favor of developed countries.
The third problem, and perhaps the most worrisome, is the sunset
clause of the CTF Governance Framework. The sunset clause is not a
problem in and of itself, but, if the COP designs a better clean
technology fund than the CTF, the sunset clause could become a
problem. The clause reads,
[T]he CTF will take necessary steps to conclude its
operations once a new financial architecture is effective.
82. Id. at para. 5.
83. Id. at para. 7(b).
84. Downes, supra note 15, at 855.
85. See Int'l Bank of Reconstr. and Dev. Articles of Agreement art. V, sec. 3(a), Feb. 16, 1989,
available at http/siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articles
ofagreement.pdf CEach member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for
each share of stock held").
86. World Bank (IBRD & 1DA), BANK INFO. CENTER, http//www.bicusa.org/en/
Institution.Structure.5.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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The Trustee will not enter into any new agreement with
contributors for contributions to the CTF once the
agreement providing for the new financial architecture
is effective. The CTF Trust Fund Committee will decide
the date on which it will cease making allocations from
the outstanding balance of the CTF.87
Initially, this appears to be a very positive step for the CTF. The
Governance Framework acknowledges that the CTF should not
undermine the COP process. However, determining when "a new
financial architecture is effective" is highly subjective, and the CTF may
not want to stop lending at the request of COP. This might only work as
a short-term strategy, but establishing an "effective" fund will certainly
be difficult if contributions continue to be funneled to the CTF rather
than a COP-created fund. Ultimately, the Bank's claims that the CTF is
only an interim measure do not seem genuine.88
2. Environmental Concerns
Another contentious aspect of selecting a clean technology fund
administrator is how the administrator will define "clean technology"
when deciding which projects to fund. In Foreign Policy magazine, Phil
Radford, the Executive Director of Greenpeace, and Jamal Saghir, the
World Bank's Director of Energy, Transport, and Water Programs,
debated the World Bank's approach to combating climate change.
Radford noted that in 2004 the World Bank's Extractive Industries
Review advised the World Bank to formalize a moratorium on lending
for coal projects. The World Bank, however, rejected that suggestion
and, between 2007 and 2009, increased funding for coal projects by
nearly 200%.89 In fact, the World Bank recently approved a $3.75 billion
loan to build a 4,800 megawatt coal-burning power plant in South
Africa.90 The plant, which would be one of the largest coal-burning
plants in the world, has sparked a great deal of anger in the
environmental community, who believe it is disingenuous for the World
Bank to posture itself as a leader in climate finance while still providing
loans to highly GHG intensive projects.9 1
87. Governance Framework, supra note 75, at para. 53.
88. Haughey, supra note 80, at 60.
89. Phil Radford, Banking on Coal, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 9, 2009),
http/www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/09/banking-on coal.
90. Lisa Friedman, Eskom Fallout Spurs New Opposition to World Bank's Role in Climate
Funding, CLIMATE WIRE (May 24, 2010), http-/www.bicusa.org/en/Article.11889.asp.
91. Id.
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Radford's primary objections to the World Bank's action were the
following: (1) coal is the most carbon-intensive form of energy
generation (without carbon capture and sequestration) and sustainable
alternatives to coal exist that can be implemented on a commercial
scale; (2) "between 6,000 and 10,700 annual deaths can be attributed to
the 88 coal-fired power plants and companies receiving public
international financing, including from the World Bank"; and (3)
although utilizing coal-fired energy may save money in the short-term,
coal-fired power plants are built to last for decades, and their GHG
emissions could make them a significant liability, both financially and
environmentally, in the future. 92 As the developing world's energy
consumption rises, developing countries will have to start reducing their
GHG emissions long before their new coal-fired power plants are
decommissioned.
On behalf of the World Bank, Saghir opined that: (1) in 2009, the
World Bank financed more renewable energy and energy efficiency
projects than fossil fuel projects; (2) the aforementioned new power
plant being constructed in South Africa with a World Bank loan will use
supercritical coal technology, which is more efficient than traditional
coal-fired plants, and "has $750 million in financing for renewable
energy and low-carbon energy efficiency components that otherwise
would not be part of the project"; and (3) utilizing least-cost power
resources is essential to increase the standard of living in the
developing world.93 He concluded that, "[u]nder very limited, case-by-
case situations with strict criteria, and when alternative lower-carbon
technologies are not immediately available, we will support least cost,
carbon-based energy solutions."94
On its face, Saghir's arguments seem well reasoned, but his
response contains several problems. Saghir did not respond to Radford's
assertion-supported by a report from the Environmental Defense
Fund 95-that coal-fired power plants built with World Bank loans have
resulted in an unacceptably high death toll due to conventional
pollution in the air and water. Also, there are important definitional
problems with what the Bank classifies as low-carbon and energy
efficient. The Environmental Defense Fund, in the same report
previously mentioned, found that the World Bank considers funding for
92. Radford, supra note 89.
93. Jamal Saghir, The World Bank Responds to Greenpeace, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 11, 2009),
http-//blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/11/the-world-bank-responds-to-greenpeace.
94. Id.
95. BRUCE RICH, ENvT. DEF. FUND, FORECLOSING THE FUTURE COAL, CUMATE AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1 (2009), available at http//www.edf.org/documentst9593_coal-plants-
report.pdf.
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supercritical coal-fired technology as "low-carbon,"9 6 making the World
Bank's claim that the new South African plant will have $750 million in
low-carbon and energy efficiency components misleading.
Although the World Bank's CTF did not fund the South African
power plant, the CTF's regulations do allow countries to receive CTF
financing for supercritical coal-fired power plants.97 Supercritical coal-
fired power plants are approximately fifteen percent more efficient than
regular coal plants, but they still emit, over several decades, millions of
tons of GHGs.98 The World Bank and other multilateral development
banks have claimed that these coal projects would be built without
additional bank financing, but that the power plants would not install
more efficient coal-burning technology without this additional
financing.99 While this argument is plausible, evidence suggests that the
World Bank's assumption is incorrect. Supercritical coal-fired plants are
already economical in India and are likely economical in other
developing countries as well. 100 For example, a 2007 Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study entitled "The Future of Coal" concluded
that because of reduced operating and fuel costs, the cost of delivered
energy from a supercritical plant is lower than from a traditional
plant.101
Clean technology aid is a scarce resource, and it should be used to
fill the void in finance for more advanced low-carbon energy projects.
There is a great deal more capital already available for traditional fossil
fuel projects than for low-carbon energy projects. 0 2 The World Bank
should be using CTF funds to build new low-carbon energy sources.
Many of the developing countries in which projects will take place need
access to capital and financial stability so that workers will invest in the
skills needed for future energy projects. Furthermore, if more money is
funneled into low-carbon energy projects, competition for those funds
between energy project developers would increase. This competition will
spur technological advancements and cost reduction strategies as firms
try to develop more efficient energy projects.
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 17-18.
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. (noting that a U.S.-based energy company is planning to build a 1,000 megawatt solar
thermal array in India's Gujarat State without funding from the World Bank).
101. Id.
102. See Russell Gold, Finding Financing- Renewable Energy Struggles, Banks Embrace
Fossil Fhels, WALL ST. J. BLOG: ENVTL. CAPrPAL (Apr. 24, 2009, 1:16 PV), http-/blogs.wsj.com/
enviromnentalcapital/2009/04/24/finding-financing-renewable-energy-struggles-banks-embrace-
fossil-fuels.
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Saghir makes an important point in that providing low-cost
electricity in developing countries is essential to reducing poverty, but
all pertinent costs in making that determination must be considered.
The World Bank must consider the loss of human life and health, as
well as environmental damage, from conventional pollutants emitted
from coal-fired power plants and from GHG emissions that contribute to
climate change. The World Bank must also consider whether
investments in coal-fired power plants are good in the long-term, when
developing countries will also have to reduce their GHG emissions.
Saghir states in his response that the World Bank engages in this in-
depth analysis, but if that is true, the World Bank must do a better job
of explaining its analysis to the public.
The World Bank could choose to change its lending practices to
make its CTF a more attractive option for selection by the COP. In some
instances, coal projects may be the best financial and environmental
investment-like integrated gasification combined cycle coal plants with
carbon capture and sequestration-but the World Bank must be willing
to provide an honest assessment of their energy investments and
significant proof that other renewable and low-carbon energy options
have been given due consideration before providing funding for coal.
3. Experience Administering Similar Funds
The United Nations has experience administering a fund very
similar to the clean technology fund proposed for GHG emissions. The
United Nations assists administration of the Multilateral Fund for
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (the Fund). 0 3 Although the
Fund has had some shortcomings, in general, it has been considered a
success.104
While the World Bank, along with the U.N. Environment Program
(UNEP), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), and the U.N.
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), played an important
103. See Memorandum from Friends of the Earth on U.S. Funding for Clean Technology
Under the U.N. Climate Convention in 2010, U.S. CLIMATE NETWORK (Mar., 2009), available at
http//www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/3-
09%20unfccc%20clean%20tech%20final.doc.
104. James Andrew Bove, A Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 9 ENvTL. LAW. 399, 410 (2003) (The Fund has been
highly successful, with over $1.6 billion pledged (through 2002) to assist parties "in meeting the
requirements of the Protocol. The Executive Committee has approved the distribution of US $1.2
billion for roughly 3,850 projects and activities in 124 developing countries .... [Currently
approved projects will account for the phase out in consumption of ODS that would have
destroyed over 142,000 tons of ozone and the phase out in production of ODS that would have
destroyed about 44,200 tons of ozone.").
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role in implementing the Fund,105 the World Bank was not selected to
direct the policies and framework of the Fund. The Fund Secretariat
and an Executive Committee that was established by the Montreal
Protocol each partly administer the Fund.106 Although the Fund is
admittedly much smaller than what would be necessary for a climate
change clean technology fund, it is still useful as a foundational model.
4. Effect on Negotiations of a Multilateral Climate Change Treaty
The finance ministers of Japan and the United Kingdom, along with
former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, stated that they believe
providing money to the World Bank's CTF is the best way to kick start
international aid for clean technology funding.107 The World Bank's CTF
may have brought more attention to clean technology aid than there
would be otherwise, but the CTF may also be a new impediment to
negotiations about clean technology funding. In addition to determining
the proper structure of a clean technology fund, the COP may have to
find a way to funnel financing away from the CTF and back into a COP-
created fund. Although this should not be as challenging for new
financing, the World Bank's CTF could potentially receive billions of
dollars from donor countries before a new COP-led fund is established.
Also, the knowledge and investment in human capital created in the
World Bank through the operation of its CTF will likely be lost when a
new clean technology fund administrator is established. If, instead, a
U.N. fund like the SCCF held the CTF's assets, the COP could more
easily shift staff and other resources to a new COP-led fund created by a
multilateral climate change treaty than it could move resources from
the World Bank to a new COP fund.
Developed countries have removed an important bargaining chip
from the table. If they were more willing to negotiate over a clean
technology fund administrator, rather than unilaterally support the
World Bank for that role, they would have leverage with developing
countries on other important issues. For example, developed countries
want commitments from developing countries that they will reduce
their emissions. However, developing countries want funds to offset the
costs of a transition to a low-carbon economy and an organization they
can trust to administer the funds. The only way both groups can achieve
their objectives is if they have a chance to negotiate. If developed
countries unilaterally decide that the World Bank's CTF is going to be
105. Id. at 414-19.
106. Id. at 411-14.
107. Paulson, supra note 26.
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the clean technology mechanism, they should expect that developing
countries are going to be resistant to binding emissions cuts.
B. Alternative Approaches to a Single Clean Technology Fund
Administrator
So far this Note has assumed that having one organization
administer the clean technology fund is preferable, and that either the
World Bank or the COP, but not both, should administer the clean
technology fund. To address any lingering questions about why that
assumption is logical, this section looks at two possible alternatives.
The first alternative is for the World Bank and the COP to be joint
administrators of the clean technology fund. However, requiring two
different organizations with different goals to decide together on policy
objectives seems highly inefficient and problematic. If they agreed to
jointly administer a clean technology fund, they might use the GEF to
provide administrative support. In some ways, the GEF represents a
middle ground between the two organizations. Even though the GEF
receives policy advice from the UNFCCC, it is in charge of its own day-
to-day operations. The World Bank founded the GEF and is one of three
implementing agencies-along with the UNEP and the UNDP. The
Bank's role as an implementing agency includes being the "[tirustee of
the GEF Trust Fund and provid[ing] administrative services."08 As a
result of this administrative relationship, developing countries are
skeptical of the GEF.09 While using the GEF could help the COP and
the World Bank find common ground on implementation, there is no
reason to think the GEF will be able to align the COP's and the World
Bank's goals for how the fund should be set up and what its general
policies should be. Ultimately, even if the World Bank and the COP
used the GEF for implementation, they would still be put in the difficult
position of having to make joint decisions about the structure of the
clean technology fund.
The second alternative is to have more than one fund administrator.
Having multiple funds could provide some benefits. For example,
competition for the most desirable projects could drive down interest
rates on clean technology loans. Also, competition to receive funding
from donor countries could drive competing funds to lower
administrative costs and increase their efficiency. However, multiple
funds create some problems. First, if there are many different funds
with different procedures, ensuring that all funds are administered in a
108. GEF, supra note 20.
109. Hunter, supra note 9, at 262-63.
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manner consistent with the principles of the UNFCCC will be much
more difficult. Second, having a single fund would ensure a uniform
application process and reduce the burden on project developers in
developing countries who would otherwise have to learn the
administrative procedures of each separate fund before applying for a
loan. Third, high barriers to entry to compete for administration of clean
technology funds1 o make it unlikely that there will be contenders for
fund administrator other than the World Bank and the COP. Although
plenty of room still exists for private finance of clean technology
projects, the high barriers to entry for public finance of clean technology
projects reduce the likelihood that there will be any new entrants in the
competition.
The costs and difficulties of each alternative appear to overshadow
their benefits. Therefore, the most likely outcome is that only one clean
technology fund will prevail and that the COP and the World Bank will
not jointly administer the fund.
C. Conclusion
To recap, the World Bank's CTF suffers from several important
flaws. Its financing of coal-fired power plants is questionable, and its
structure does not guarantee equal representation for developing
countries, particularly LDCs. On the other hand, the United Nations
has experience setting up a similar clean technology framework for the
Montreal Protocol. Moreover, developing countries are more likely to
agree to emissions reductions in a multilateral climate change
agreement if they have a voice in what institution becomes the clean
technology fund administrator. It may be more difficult for all the
countries of the COP to come to an agreement on the structure of a
clean technology fund, but the coalitions that developed and developing
countries have formed to negotiate a climate change treaty should help
reduce transaction costs. To prevent collective action problems, a COP-
led fund should mimic the World Bank's CTF and have a small number
of trustees that are appointed on a rotating basis so that all members of
the COP could eventually participate.
As the World Bank's CTF is currently structured, it should not be
selected as the permanent clean technology fund administrator, and it is
unlikely that it would be selected by the COP. Yet, the World Bank's
CTF could be reformed to stop lending for coal projects-except perhaps
110. Barriers to entry would include political obstacles, like attaining international legitimacy,
and also requirements of institutional capacity to connect with numerous stakeholders to deal
with global problems.
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under the most compelling circumstances-and to more adequately
represent the interests of the least developed countries that are
critically impacted by climate change. If the World Bank accomplishes
this goal, the COP could reasonably select it as permanent clean
technology fund administrator. Conversely, if the World Bank does not
make these reforms, a new COP-created fund would be a better
alternative.
IV. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS OVER THE WORLD
BANK'S CTF
Having looked at the different interest groups, their arguments over
clean technology funds, and the merits of those claims, the COP appears
to be the best organization to design and administer a clean technology
fund. If the COP creates this new fund, the World Bank's CTF should
cease operating. If developed and developing countries support a new
COP-created fund, donor countries may naturally stop financing the
CTF. That would be the simplest way for the CTF to cease operations.
Alternatively, the World Bank may voluntarily end its CTF when a new
fund is established. Commentators have noted that "[t]he Bretton
Woods institutions, recognizing that legitimacy depends on acting
within the UN legal order, have increased their cooperation and
consultation with the United Nations.""' However, there is no
guarantee the World Bank's CTF will shut down so easily.
The World Bank may argue that the CTF should be retained as a
secondary clean technology fund. If some developed countries agree with
the World Bank's idea, they may split their contributions between the
CTF and a COP fund, thereby diverting important resources from the
better aid mechanism. As this Note earlier concluded, the CTF as
currently organized and a COP-led fund would not function well
together. If the World Bank's decision to the keep the CTF open attracts
donor countries away from the COP fund, another question arises:
Would the United Nations have any recourse against the CTF and its
donors?
Since its inception, the World Bank has fiercely guarded its
independence. During initial negotiations with the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), the U.N. body that adopts
specialized agencies under Articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter, the
World Bank seemed uninterested in joining the United Nations. "The
[World] Bank was very fearful that becoming a specialized agency of the
111. NIGEL D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 268
(2002).
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United Nations would subject it to undesirable political control or
influence and hurt its credit rating in Wall Street . . . ."112 Eventually,
the World Bank decided to join the United Nations, but the agreement
the World Bank initially drafted was seen as "more a declaration of
independence from than cooperation with the United Nations."113 After
negotiations with the United Nations over the draft agreement, the
World Bank agreed to some concessions in the language. Nevertheless,
the final agreement still clearly favors the World Bank's autonomy.
Under the agreement, known as Resolution 124 (II), the World Bank
"is, and is required to function as an independent international
organization."114 It only has to give "due consideration to the inclusion
in the agenda of items proposed by the United Nations."11 5 Also, the
United Nations may only appropriately make "recommendations" about
technical aspects of World Bank programs or projects.116 The ECOSOC
was given authority under the charter to define the terms of the
relationship between the specialized agencies it brought in, and it
defined the terms favorably to the World Bank. After the U.N. General
Assembly's approval of the agreement in accordance with Article 63,
there is little basis to challenge the World Bank's independent status.
If the United Nations cannot challenge the World Bank's autonomy
directly, then the next best route is to challenge the countries that are
members of the World Bank's CTF. The U.N. Charter provides some
explanation of the hierarchy between the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states, "In the
event of a conflict between the obligations of a Member of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." 117 This hierarchy of agreements is imposed on
the states, rather than on the subsidiary organizations directly, 118 but
the Charter does not create any obligation for donor countries to leave
the CTF, either in explicit terms-because the Charter was created long
before the CTF--or in more abstract terms.
However, recourse may be had through the CTF's donor countries.
Under the UNFCCC treaty, developed countries have an obligation to
provide clean technology financing for developing countries according to
112. EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS 56
(1973).
113. Id. at 57.
114. Agreement between UN and IBRD, supra note 11, at 198, art. I, para. 2.
115. Id. at 199, art. III.
116. Id. at 199, art. IV para. 4.
117. U.N. Charter art. 103.
118. WHIrE, supra note 111, at 12.
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certain principles. Under Article 11, those principles include
accountability to the COP and "an equitable and balanced
representation of all Parties within a transparent system of
governance."e19 The World Bank could argue that the structure of its
CTF includes equitable representation and that its sunset clause makes
it in effect accountable to the COP, but, as section II of this article
determined, this argument is not convincing. Because of discrepancies
between the CTF Governance Framework and the UNFCCC, it has been
argued that contributions to the CTF should not count toward developed
countries' obligations under the UNFCCC.120 This argument does not
restrict what the CTF itself does, but it would put donor countries in
noncompliance with the UNFCCC.
One final argument is that the sunset clause of the World Bank's
CTF provides that the CTF will stop financing new projects when a new
financial architecture is effective. Because "effective" is an ambiguous
term, this language does not provide a guarantee that the World Bank
will shut down the CTF. The COP could argue that the fund is effective
when a new climate change treaty is drafted and that the World Bank's
CTF should conclude its operations at that time. However, the decision
to conclude operations of the fund ultimately rests with the CTF Trust
Fund Committee, not the COP.
These legal arguments indicate that it is unlikely the United
Nations could force the World Bank to stop operating the CTF. The
terms of the World Bank's relationship with the ECOSOC and the
United Nations give it significant autonomy and, in this instance, do not
create a duty to the United Nations. Under the CTF's Framework there
is a legal duty to shut down the CTF when the COP has created a new
clean technology fund, but the timeframe in which the CTF must be
shut down is ambiguous and would allow the CTF to continue operating
at least in the short term after a new fund is created. The best legal
argument the COP has is that donations to the CTF do not satisfy a
country's obligations under the UNFCCC treaty, but the UNFCCC
treaty lacks an enforcement mechanism. Thus, something other than
legal arguments is needed for the COP to prevail in a future dispute
over the CTF.
CONCLUSION
One key component of a successful climate change treaty will be an
agreement between developed and developing countries on international
119. UNFCCC, supra note 48, at art. 11.
120. See Haughey, supra note 80.
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aid for clean technology. Moreover, for a climate change treaty to be
successful, the treaty must consider the views of LDCs and small island
states. The World Bank's CTF is by no means fatally flawed, but, as it is
currently structured, a sufficient guarantee that voting rights for the
Trust Fund Committee will be equitably divided to include the poorest
nations is noticeably missing. The World Bank also has a history of
funding massive coal projects without providing sufficient evidence that
the favorable terms of public loans were necessary to get those projects
off the ground. The CTF leaves the door open for the World Bank to
finance more coal projects in the future and does not provide enough
assurance that renewable energy and energy efficiency projects are
being given due consideration. Unless the World Bank reforms its CTF,
the COP should develop a new clean technology fund to take the CTF's
place.

